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or psychologically such a course would be either beneficial or practical. It hardly
seems possible for the United States to remain indifferent to the course of events in
the rest of the world. Mr. Harding had that idea too, but he soon confessed, after becoming President, that it was impracticable. And if we are interested in fact, then it
seems the height-or depth-of ostrichism to pretend that we are not, and the depth
of negligence or cowardice to refrain from doing what we can, within the measure of the
values at stake, to solve the problem.
We have here, then, an extremely able, but far from simple, ex pare plea in what
without exaggeration may be described as the most important problem of human relations, social science, and American policy, of this age. It is full of personal and political
feeling, dialectical subtlety--see the prejudicial statement in the first line of the
Preface, and such items occur all through the book-, and bitter rhetoric. It is deplorable that such treatment should be given to a vital problem of broadest national
and human importance. The fate of the present League of Nations is of very small
moment indeed in comparison with it. The injustices, such as they are, of the present
territorial and economic international distribution, are of limited and passing importance. The antagonism between the ultra-nationalist nations of today and the
great body of nations which are trying to build up a system of pacific international
order and progress,-even that is of subordinate importance and it is conceivable that
Germany will become cooperative again and Poland violent. What is important is the
conflict between two fundamental philosophies and techniques of international relations. On one side are solidarity, organization, cooperation, effectively sanctioned in
the extreme case, if need be, and all this not merely in behalf of existing rights but in
behalf of progressive change by pacific means. On the other, are anarchy, disorder,
isolation, neutrality, and war. The present volume, without its author intending so
entirely, is a contribution on the latter side.
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Mr. Meiklejohn, under whose leadership Mr. Cohen, Mr. Hamilton and the reviewer have all taught, furnishes a foreword, not only to one of these books, but to the
future teaching of law in the United States. In the light of his successful experience
at Amherst, Wisconsin and San Francisco, he has concluded that our civilization can
best be understood by concentrating attention first on our law, and particularly our
constitutional law. He has been a leader in urging that education should be a coherent
effort to understand our civilization. It is significant, therefore, to find him, as his
view gains ground, arguing that for adults at least the starting place for education is
the law. Every student should read his compact and instructive foreword to Mr.
Cohen's collection of cases.
The cases themselves are well selected. Inevitably, in such a rapidly growing field,
* Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. Visiting Professor of International
Relations, University of Chicago.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
they become quickly out of date. This of itself should be instructive to a student; and
the main lines of decision persist sufficiently so that the case material here can be
readily supplemented. It is clear, nowadays, even to most laymen, that it is only in
the light of outdoor situations that decisions can be understood. Mr. Cohen, as an
old student of Mr. Hamilton, must realize this even better than most of us. It is to
be hoped that he will make available for general use a selection from the other materials which he must use to supplement his discussion of the reports of cases.
The Power to Govern is an example of the wide range and usefulness of such supplementary material. It is a discussion of the historical setting of the federal Constitution
in so far as the setting furnishes indications of the meaning of the Commerce Clause.
There is a particularly interesting chapter on the words available in Eighteenth Century dictionaries, as a clue to economic history and the political economy of the time.
There is a full discussion of the American problem and the course of English and
American "mercantilist" thought. The argument is designed to show that the mercantilist tradition was in full force in Eighteenth Century America, and that in the
light of this body of opinion wide scope should be given to Congress in its exercise of
power over interstate commerce.
The argument has much force and has strengthened the reviewer's opinion that there
is nothing in the Constitution to prevent Congress from acting to serve great national
needs. At the same time, some of the irony and significance of later constitutional
history seem to be lost if one does not recognize the strength of the counter current of
opinion that was already at work modifying mercantilist opinions. This counter current goes back at least as far as the Case of the Monopolies,which though only remotely2
in point was much relied on in Mr. justice Field's dissent in the Slaughterhouse Cases
which in turn was the creator of our modem due process doctrines. The same influence appears in Webster's argument in Gibbons v. Ogden,3 which is the best ultimate
source of that strange body of doctrine which prevents New York from burdening
interstate commerce by regulating the price at which Vermont milk is sold in New
York.4 The skeptical student can explain the difference between congressional regulation of interstate trade in lottery tickets, women, impure food, and stolen automobiles,
on the one hand, and the products of child labor on the other, only by reference to the
persistence of some such influence. The Case of the Monopolies, the Wealth of Nations,
the Boston Tea Party, and the early frontier are signs of historical forces which were at
work along with the tradition of mercantilism. What Mr. Hamilton's book does is to
remind us persuasively that the influences affecting the Fathers' minds were not
simple; and that there is no reason to read one economic theory rather than another
into the broad enabling words of the federal Constitution. In this respect, Mr. Hamilton's book belongs in a significant place with a growing body of critical and historical
studies. Its timeliness hardly needs to be pointed out.
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